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Note
A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The
Improper Consideration of Mitigating
Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing
by
JOSHUA N. SONDHEIMER*
The determination of whether a defendant convicted of a capital
crime will be executed is made, under nearly all of the current death
penalty statutes in the United States, by a judge or jury1 weighing the
"mitigating factors ' 2 in the case against the "aggravating factors."'3 If
the factors aggravating the gravity of the crime outweigh those factors
calling for a sentence less than death, the sentencing authority is then
permitted,4 and in some states required, 5 to impose the death penalty.
* B.A. 1986, University of California, Berkeley; Member, Third Year Class.
I. Although the majority of states provide for jury sentencing in capital cases, some
states allow the judge to be the sentencing authority, or to override the recommendation of an
advisory jury. Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1980); see, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1985) (judge has final authority to impose or withhold death
sentence notwithstanding jury recommendation). See also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447
463 (1984) (thirty of the thirty-seven death penalty jurisdictions give ultimate sentencing au-
thority to the jury.) In Spaziano, the Supreme Court determined that jury sentencing is not
constitutionally requried. Id. at 457-65.
2. "Mitigating factors," also called mitigating circumstances; are any aspects of a de-
fendant's character, background, record, offense, or any other circumstances proffered by the
defendant that, although not constituting excuse or justification for the crime, might serve as a
basis for a sentence less than death. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978). Typical
mitigating factors include extreme mental illness, youth, or a lack of prior criminal activity.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 1985).
3. "Aggravating factors," or aggravating circumstances, are those facts about the de-
fendant's record or the offense that militate in favor of imposing capital punishment upon a
capital defendant. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Harrison 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1989).
4. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(3) (West 1985) (death sentence optional though
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstance).
5. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988) (trier of fact "shall impose a sen-
tence of death if the trier of fact concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating circumstances"). The California Supreme Court has rejected a mechanistic con-
strnction of the words "outweigh" and "shall" in the statute, stating that the law "should not
[409]
Even in those states that do not direct the sentencer to weigh mitigating
and aggravating factors, the sentencer's determination depends neverthe-
less upon consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
in the case.6
Implicit in these statutes is the assumption that aggravating and
mitigating circumstances are readily distinguishable and amenable to cat-
egorization. As perceptive commentators and judges have recognized,
however, jurors may view certain mitigating factors as factors aggravat-
ing the gravity of a capital crime. Consequently, jurors may, and some-
times do, improperly weigh mitigating factors on the side of aggravation,
altering the proper balance between aggravating and mitigating factors in
a particular case and depriving defendants of what the United States
Supreme Court has declared to be their constitutional right to have each
mitigating factor considered "as a mitigating factor."' 7 In this Note, this
problem is called "improper consideration."
In its June 1989 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh,8 the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged that certain mitigating evidence may be
susceptible to conflicting interpretations. As the Court observed, evi-
dence of defendant Penry's mental retardation and history of physical
abuse, in the absence of proper guidance to the jury, constituted a "two-
edged sword" because it "diminish[ed] his blameworthiness for his crime
even as it indicate[d] that there is a probability that he will be dangerous
be understood to require any juror to vote for the death penalty unless, upon completion of the
'weighing' process, he decides that death is the appropriate penalty under all the circum-
stances." People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 541, 709 P.2d 440, 456, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 653
(1985). The constitutionality of the mandatory form of the California statutes, however, is
currently on review before the United States Supreme Court. People v. Boyde, 46 Cal. 3d 212,
758 P.2d 25, 250 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 2447 (1989).
6. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1989), construed
in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271-74 (1976); and OR. REV. STAT.§ 163.150 (Supp. 1988) as
amended by H.B. 2250, § 135a, 1989 Legislative Session (adding to Oregon statute the require-
ment that the jury consider the extent to which mitigating circumstances may reduce defend-
ant's "moral culpability or blameworthiness for the crime"). The eighth and fourteenth
amendments require that states provide a mechanism for the jury to consider and act upon any
relevant mitigating evidence, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978), and that the sen-
tencer's discretion to impose death be channeled by a consideration of factors that justify exe-
cution. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197-98 (1976).
7. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). See, e.g., Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882,
886 (Fla. 1979) (because the heinousness of the defendant's crime was a direct consequence of
his mental illness, the mental disorder could not be used in aggravation); People v. Jackson, 28
Cal. 3d 264, 353, 618 P.2d 149, 187, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 641 (1980) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that California's death penalty statute fails to identify factors as aggravating or miti-
gating, so sentencing authorities may reach different conclusions about the nature of specified
factors), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981); see also Liebman & Shephard, Guiding Sentencer
Discretion Beyond the "Boilerplate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating Factor, 66 GEO. L.J. 757,
821 n.276 (1978) (mitigating circumstances may relate to aggravating circumstances where
both result from the abnormal mental condition).
8. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
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in the future." 9 The Court imposed a case-specific remedy for this prob-
lem, however, failing to recognize the doubt this admission casts on the
reliability of modem capital sentencing schemes. Mental illness is a
principal example of a mitigating factor that may lead to the problem of
improper consideration. Although the Anglo-American system of crimi-
nal justice without exception has viewed mental illness as a factor militat-
ing leniency in criminal punishment, 10 this Note will demonstrate that
sentencers can and do weigh this factor on the side of aggravation. This
may occur, for example, when a prosecutor argues that a defendant's
impaired mental abilities render him incapable of conforming his aggres-
sive conduct and that he therefore poses a continuing threat to the
community. 11
Other factors intended to function solely as mitigating circum-
stances may be viewed instead as aggravating. As the Penry Court recog-
nized, evidence of a defendant's mental retardation or deprived and
abusive childhood, either of which should favor leniency, may also be
considered by the sentencer as aggravating circumstances because they
suggest future dangerousness. Age, intoxication, or conditions such as
pathological alcoholism may also be seen as aggravating circumstances,
either independently or because of a substantial causal link to an aggra-
vating factor. Because this issue has arisen most often in connection with
a defendant's mental illness, this Note focuses on mental illness.
In Zant v. Stephens 12 the United States Supreme Court indicated for
the first time that it recognized the potential problems posed by ambigu-
ous 13 mitigating factors. 14 The Court stated in dictum that the Constitu-
tion could not tolerate a state considering mental illness as a factor in
aggravation. The Court stated that due process would be violated if a
state "attached the 'aggravating' label to... conduct that actually should
militate in favor of a lesser penalty, such as perhaps the defendant's
mental illness."' 15
9. Id. at 2949.
10. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text; Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885
(1983).
11. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 922-26 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) (defendant's mental retardation evinced inability to learn from
his mistakes and thus related to defendant's future dangerousness); Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d
882, 885-86 (Fla. 1979) (judge impermissibly used defendant's mental illness and resulting
propensity to commit violent acts as an aggravating factor).
12. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
13. This Note refers to these factors as "ambiguous" because their nature as factors that
should mitigate rather than aggravate punishment may not be self-evident to a jury. The use
of the term "ambiguous" is not intended to suggest that these factors might properly be con-
sidered as aggravating factors.
14. Id. at 885.
15. Id. (citing Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885-86 (Fla. 1979)).
Whether this strict prohibition against the use of mitigating circum-
stances as aggravating factors applies to situations in which the sen-
tencer, rather than the state, attaches the improper "aggravating" label
has not yet been made clear. The Stephens Court's dictum and particu-
larly the Court's reference to a Florida case invalidating a death sentence
due to the judge's improper consideration of the defendant's mental ill-
ness as an aggravating factor, suggests that improper "labeling" by the
sentencer also would violate due process.
This Note argues that, with respect to these "two-edged" mitigating
factors, modern death penalty schemes provide little more in the way of
jury guidance than the Georgia statute struck down in Furman v.
Georgia. 16 Therefore, the schemes perpetuate the irrationality and poten-
tial for arbitrariness that the Court has held violate the eighth' 7 and four-
teenth18  amendments' prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment. 19
Section I of this Note examines the constitutional requirements es-
tablished by the Supreme Court for capital punishment statutes. Section
II explores how the problem of misapplication of mitigating factors oc-
curs under several states' death sentencing schemes. Section III argues
that modern death penalty statutes, by condoning the misapplication of
mitigating factors, do not meet the Supreme Court's minimum require-
ments for constitutional death penalty sentencing. Finally, Section IV
identifies several solutions that may help prevent the deprivations of capi-
tal defendants' constitutional rights when judges and juries consider miti-
gating factors as aggravating evidence.
16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
17. The eighth amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18. The fourteenth amendment provides, "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. The Court has emphasized the eighth amendment in analyzing the constitutionality
of the death penalty and death penalty procedures. See Gillers, supra note 1, at 1, 8-11. Jus-
tice Stewart, however, concurring in Furman noted a "procedural content" in the eighth
amendment that was required to prevent the wanton and freakish imposition of the death
penalty. Furman, 408 U.S. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). The 1976 Cases and subse-
quent decisions make clear that the special nature of the death penalty requires a heightened
concern for procedural due process. See infra notes 21-57 and accompanying text.
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I. "Super Due Process for Death":20 Constitutional
Death Sentencing
Prior to the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Furman v. Geor-
gia,21 juries in death penalty cases typically were given unbridled free-
dom to impose or withhold the penalty of death. Decisions often were
made solely on the basis of evidence presented during the guilt phase of
the criminal trial.22 The results of this standardless sentencing system
are notorious. 23 In the eyes of the Justices themselves, the death penalty
was being imposed at least in an arbitrary or "freakish" 24 manner, if not
actually discriminatorily and capriciously, 25 against people of color and
the poor.
After Furman repudiated statutes that left the death decision to the
untrammeled discretion of the jury, the Supreme Court sought, in a se-
ries of five companion cases decided in 1976 ("the 1976 Cases"), to posi-
tively identify the requirements of a constitutional death sentencing
procedure. 26 The Court announced these new principles when reviewing
20. This subtitle has been borrowed from Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for
Persons: Super Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980).
21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. See W. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE EIGHTIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 5 (1987).
23. See B. NAKELL & K. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY 82
(1987) (summarizing pre-Furman empirical studies of discrimination in the administration of
the death penalty. The studies revealed that; a) in the South, nonwhite defendants are most
likely to receive death penalty; b) outside the South, white defendants are more likely to have
death sentences imposed on them; and c) defendants convicted of killing whites are more likely
to be executed than those convicted of killing nonwhites); Greenberg, Capital Punishment as a
System, 91 YALE L.J. 908, 910-11 (1982) (noting that virtually all capital defendants are indi-
gent, and that many were sentenced when free legal services were not readily available and
automatic appeals of right had not yet been instituted); Wolfgang & Reidel, Rape, Race, and
the Death Penalty in Georgia, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 658, 666-67 (1975); Wolfgang &
Reidel, Race, Judicial Discretion and the Death Penalty, 407 ANNALS 126-33 (1973) (strong
evidence bias against black defendants convicted of raping white victims).
24. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's explanation of
the rationale behind Furman is perhaps the most recognized. Regarding the "freakish" nature
of pre-Furman sentences, Stewart stated that the imposition of the death penalty is "cruel and
unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual." Id. at 309.
25. Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
26. The five companion decisions, all announced on July 2, 1976, marked a watershed in
the development of capital punishment in America. Although the Court's opinion in each of
the cases was delivered only by a plurality (the disposition of each case depended on the votes
of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens), the basic principles underlying the decisions remain
the foundation of modem death penalty law. The five cases, referred to here as "the 1976
Cases," are: Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); and
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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five of the twenty-eight death penalty statutes enacted by state legisla-
tures in response to Furman.27
Two basic categories of sentencing schemes emerged following
Furman. Shortly after Furman, fourteen states adopted a form of the
Model Penal Code, requiring the sentencing authority to weigh aggravat-
ing and mitigating circumstances. Statutes of this broad type, sometimes
called "guided discretion" statutes, have since been implemented in all
but a few of the thirty-seven death penalty jurisdictions. 28 The second
type of post-Furman statute, adopted in the remaining fourteen states,
made the death sentence mandatory for defendants convicted of any one
of certain enumerated capital crimes, such as murder of a peace officer or
of more than one person, felony murder, or contract murder. 29 The state
of Texas adopted an atypical procedure requiring the sentencing jury to
answer three questions relating to the degree of deliberation, the defend-
ant's likelihood of future dangerousness, and use of unreasonable force in
response to provocation. Each of the questions must be answered in the
affirmative for the death sentence to be imposed.
In deciding the companion cases, the Court evaluated the constitu-
tionality of the Georgia and Florida statutes, 30 which followed the
"guided discretion" format; the statutes of North Carolina and Louisi-
ana,3 1 which followed the mandatory death sentence scheme; and the
unique Texas statute. 32 Although no single rationale won a majority of
the Court in any of the five cases, a shifting majority of the Court held
that the "guided discretion" statutes of Georgia and Florida, and Texas'
jury-interrogatory scheme, provided a sufficient level of guidance to pro-
mote reliable sentencing and therefore cure the risk of arbitrariness that
had plagued earlier statutes.3 3 The Court struck down the mandatory
27. See Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty Statutes, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1690, 1691 n.6 (1974). The five statutes reviewed in the 1976 Cases were FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Supp. 1977) (current version at id. (West 1985 & Supp. 1989)); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (Supp. 1975) (current version at id. (Harrison 1988)); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974) (current version at id. (West 1986 and Supp. 1989)), amended by
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905 (West 1984 and Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-
17 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (current version at id. (Supp. 1988)); and TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1975-1976) (current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
§ 37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1989)).
28. Geimer & Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten
Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1988). Only Texas and Oregon employ
atypical sentencing procedures that depart substantially from the Model Penal Code format.
See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1989); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 163.150 (Supp. 1988).
29. See Note, supra note 27 at 1710-12.
30. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
31. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976).
32. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
33. Id. at 208-77; Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 247-60; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 196-207.
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death penalty statutes, however, insisting that constitutional sentencing
required consideration by the sentencer of the individualized circum-
stances of each defendant and each offense to ensure that the penalty of
death is justified.34
Despite the fact that these cases revealed a deep division within the
Court over the death penalty issue,35 these two principles-that the jury
must consider the individual circumstances involved in each case, and
that it must be given adequate guidance to identify and evaluate those
factors-have been identified as the touchstones of constitutional capital
sentencing procedure. 36
A. Individualization
The doctrine of individualized sentencing was set out most fully by
the Court in Woodson v. North Carolina.37 Ih its decision invalidating
North Carolina's mandatory death statute, the plurality noted that the
Court had long recognized the principle that" '[f]or the determination of
sentences, justice generally requires the consideration of more than the
particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be
taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the
character and propensities of the offender.' "38
Until Woodson, the practice of individualized sentencing had been
instituted merely to reflect enlightened policy; the court raised this prac-
tice to a constitutional imperative, stating: "[I]n capital cases the funda-
mental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . .
requires consideration of the character and record of the individual of-
fender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitution-
ally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death."' 39
In announcing this "individualization" requirement, the Court's
main concern was insuring that the sentencer not be precluded from con-
sidering factors that could mitigqte the justification for imposing a capital
sentence. The Court has yet to express the parallel interest in insuring
the sentencer's consideration of aggravating factors. Rather, the Court
34. Roberts, 428 U.S. at 331-36; Woodson, 428 U.S. 285-305.
35. Twenty-four separate opinions were filed in the five 1976 Cases. The joint lead opin-
ions filed in each case by Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, however,'have been regarded as
the source of the Court's capital sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
862, 874-75, 879 (citing plurality opinions); and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602-08 (citing
plurality opinion in Woodson as source of the principle of unlimited mitigation principle; com-
paring Ohio death penalty statute to statutes upheld by plurality in 1976 Cases.)
36. See Hertz & Weisberg, In Mitigation of the Penalty of Death: Lockett v. Ohio and the
Capital Defendant's Right to Presentation of Mitigating Circumstances, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 317,
320-23 (1981); Liebman & Shephard, supra note 7, at 759.
37. 428 U.S. 280, 280 (1976).
38. Id. at 304 (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)).
39. Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
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continues to emphasize that a process according no significance to these
individualized factors "excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate
punishment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind."40 Such a process
would treat defendants not as human beings, but rather as a "faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty
of death. '41 Thus, this type of process could not be consistent with the
"respect for humanity" required by the eighth amendment. The Court's
rulings established a constitutional right of capital defendants to receive
sentencer consideration of mitigating circumstances. 42
It was not until two years later in Lockett v. Ohio,43 that the Court
enunciated the scope of this right. In striking down Ohio's death penalty
statute limiting the mitigating factors a jury could consider, the Court
established the principles that capital defendants must be allowed to
proffer any and all evidence of mitigating factors they wish to put for-
ward and that sentencers must not be precluded from giving "independ-
ent mitigating weight"'44 to such evidence. 45 The Court noted that this
principle of "unlimited mitigation ' 46 is compelled by the constitutional
imperative of reliable sentencing.47 As the Court stated:
[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving
independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character
and record and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation
creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of fac-
tors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is be-
tween life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with
the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. 48
Consequently, the eighth and fourteenth amendments require that the
sentencer "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of the defendant's character or record which may militate in favor
of a lesser penalty." '49
Thus, the Lockett requirement that the sentencer consider indepen-
dently, "as a mitigating factor,"' 50 each mitigating factor established by
40. Id. (emphasis added). See, Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 36, at 336-37.
41. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
42. See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 36, at 323.
43. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
44. Id. at 605.
45. Id. at 608.
46. See Comment, Dark Year on Death Row: Guiding Sentencer Discretion After Zant,
Barclay and Harris, 17 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 689, 698 (1984) (authored by R. Wirick).
47. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (reliability required because a
sentence imposed under unreliable proceedings would be cruel and unusual given the finality of
death).
48. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
49. Id. at 604 (emphasis in original).
50. Id.
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the defendant, renders any scheme that allows the sentencer to consider
mitigating factors on the side of aggravation constitutionally suspect.51
B. Guidance
In the 1976 Cases, the Court recognized that the goal of reducing
the risk of arbitrariness could not be met merely by directing the jury to
consider the particular circumstances of each case. Unguided jury dis-
cretion was the precise problem that led to the Furman Court's reexami-
nation of arbitrariness in death sentencing. Thus, the Court stated in
1976 that constitutional death penalty statutes also would have to pro-
vide for an "informed, focused, guided, and objective inquiry into the
question whether [the defendant] should be sentenced to death. ' 52 The
Court insisted that such guidance is not only a hallmark of the American
jury system, but is especially necessary when the sentencer's decision in-
volves the ultimate criminal penalty.5 3
Although the Court's language was characteristically vague in the
1976 Cases, the five companion decisions do provide some indication of
the nature of the guidance requirement. The 1976 Cases suggest that the
guidance requirement has both a substantive and procedural nature. As
the Court stated in Gregg v. Georgia, 54 the sentencer must be both "ap-
prised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and pro-
vided with standards to guide its use of the information. '55
The substantive aspect of guidance is satisfied by focusing the atten-
tion of the jury on those factors that the "State, representing organized
society, deems particularly relevant to the sentencing decision."' 56 In the
Court's view, the "guided discretion" statutes of Florida and Georgia
and the interrogatory format of Texas's scheme focused the jury's atten-
tion on aggravating and mitigating factors through lists or questions
drawn by state legislatures, thereby sufficiently informing the jury of the
relevant factors to be considered in its decision.57
The Court did not articulate a clear standard relating to the proce-
dural aspect of guidance. The Court's approval of the "weighing" in-
struction under the Florida and Georgia statutes, and the "yes or no"
approach under Texas' law, however, indicates that a low threshold level
of procedural guidance will suffice. The requirement appears to be satis-
fied as long as the jury is given rudimentary instructions regarding how
to use the evidence presented. The difficulties presented by complex miti-
51. See infra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
52. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259 (1976).
53. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 193 (1976).
54. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
55. Id. at 195.
56. Id. at 192.
57. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 251-53; Gregg, 428
U.S. at 196-98.
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gating factors such as mental illness, retardation, and pathological alco-
holism raise the question whether the guidance provided in these and
similar statutes meets even the Court's modest threshold.
II. Improper Consideration Examined
American criminal law has long struggled with the relationship
between mental disorders and criminal culpability. Although debate
continues over incorporation of this relationship into the legal regime,
the underlying premise of the debate has remained constant-impaired
mental capacity vitiates criminal responsibility and therefore warrants
leniency in determining punishment. 58 Because the mitigatory nature of
mental disorder may not be self-evident, this section first surveys how
Anglo-American penal law historically has dealt with the issue of mental
disorder. This examination helps to illuminate the nature of the constitu-
tional and ethical deficiencies of modern death sentencing statutes. The
second part of this section then analyzes how the death penalty statutes
of three states permit improper consideration of mitigating factors such
as mental illness as aggravating factors.
A. Mental Illness as a Mitigating Factor: History and Theory
The American penal system, without exception, has accorded spe-
cial consideration and leniency to criminals suffering from mental abnor-
malities.59 Following British tradition dating back to the medieval
period, American colonial courts granted special dispensations to men-
tally disordered criminal defendants. 60 In 1908, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska became the first appellate court in the country to reduce a
death sentence to life imprisonment solely because the defendant's physi-
cal and mental condition, though not amounting to legal insanity, re-
duced culpability for the crime.61  Many other industrialized
democracies have general provisions requiring that mental disorder be
taken into account as a mitigating factor in all sentencing decisions. 62
These principles often have been explicitly incorporated into mitiga-
tion in contemporary death penalty sentencing. For example, the Model
Penal Code includes "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" and
58. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(2) comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (im-
paired mental capacity reduces criminal responsibility).
59. See 1 N. WALKER, CRIME AND INSANITY IN ENGLAND 17-27 (1968).
60. E. POWERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 529 (1966).
61. Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb. 148, 168, 115 N.W. 850, 857 (1908).
62. See F. ZIMRING AND G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE AMERICAN
AGENDA 4-6 (1986) (every Western European democracy nonetheless has stopped executing
criminals through de jure or de facto abolition, or abolition except for specific offenses during
wartime); and Liebman & Shephard, supra note 7, at 797 nn.171-73 (capital punishment stat-
ute of Greece requires consideration of character and level of development).
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"mental disease or defect" among its list of mitigating factors in capital
cases. 63 At least twenty states include some form of mental disorder
specifically as a mitigating factor in their death statutes. 64 The intent
behind the inclusion of these factors as mitigating factors is clear As the
Florida Supreme Court said of that state's death penalty law, "a large
number of the statutory mitigating factors reflect a legislative determina-
tion to mitigate the death penalty in favor of a life sentence for those
persons whose responsibility for their violent actions has been substan-
tially diminished as a result of a mental illness, uncontrolled emotional
state of mind, or drug abuse."'65
Two commentators also have argued that a rational and consistent
social policy requires treating a broad range of mental disorders as miti-
gating factors.66 This study analyzed two types of mental disorder,
mental retardation and sociopathy, in light of the dual penological goals
of retribution and deterrence that the Supreme Court has used as pri-
mary rationales for the death penalty. 67 The study began from the prem-
ise that mental disorders should be considered as mitigating factors only
when such disorders "reduce[ ] one or both of the penological justifica-
tions for the death penalty" 68 identified in the 1976 Cases. Analysis of
mental retardation and sociopathy under the Court's penological ratio-
nales revealed that both types of disorder reduced the value of either
retribution and deterrence or both, and should therefore be viewed as
mitigating factors. 69
Although mental disorders have been explicitly defined in many
state statutes as mitigating factors, improper consideration of mental dis-
orders can still occur in a number of ways. For example, even if a statute
specifically lists certain factors as "mitigating," the possibility remains
that the defendant's mental disorder will be identified as, or linked to,
one of the listed aggravating circumstances. 70 Moreover, the disorder
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(b) (1980) (extreme mental or emotional distur-
bance); § 210.6(4)(g) (1980) (mental disease or defect).
64. See Liebman & Shephard, supra note 7, at 794 n.158.
65. Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 886 (1979).
66. Liebman & Shephard, supra note 7, at 806-36.
67. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976).
68. Liebman & Shephard, supra note 7, at 818. The authors note a "striking uniformity
of view" among commentators that a mental disorder should mitigate only when it would
reduce justifications for the death penalty that have been identified by the Supreme Court. Id.
69. Id. at 822-34. But af Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1380-84 (9th Cir. 1988) (jury
instruction that could have permitted defendant's sociopathy to be considered in aggravation
held valid).
70. The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, has reversed at least two convictions
when it found that the trial judge considered the defendant's mental illness as an aggravating
factor, Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885-86 (1979) (per curiam), or that aggravating circum-
stances identified by the judge were the "direct consequence" of the defendant's mental illness,
Huckaby v. State, 343 So. 2d 29, 33-34 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977).
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may be identified as a nonstatutory aggravating factor, that is, a factor
considered by the jury as an aggravating circumstance but not enumer-
ated in the statutory list of aggravating factors. 7 1 For instance, the jury
may find that the defendant's mental illness calls for the imposition of the
death penalty because it renders him dangerous and unable to learn from
his mistakes.
B. Improper Consideration Under Three Death Penalty Statutes
Despite the unwavering stance of Anglo-American law that certain
behavioral disorders require leniency in sentencing, and despite the
Supreme Court's sentencing directives, modern death penalty laws never-
theless permit and even condone the misapplication of mitigating factors.
Examination of the statutes of California, Texas, and Florida demon-
strates this point.72
Modern authorities agree that mental illness is a factor that miti-
gates criminal culpability and therefore militates in favor of leniency in
sentencing. 73 Nonetheless, sentencing authorities can and do interpret
mental illness as an aggravating factor because of the belief that the de-
fendant's disorder presents a continuing danger to society. 74 Thus, either
because a defendant's threat of future dangerousness is identified as an
aggravating factor by statute or because it is considered as a nonstatutory
aggravating factor, evidence of a defendant's mental illness will weigh on
the wrong side of the sentencing scale.
71. Approximately half of the death penalty states specifically preclude jurors from con-
sidering aggravating circumstances not listed by statute. Gillers, supra note 1, at 101-19.
These prohibitions have proven ineffective, however, since a number of these jurisdictions have
determined the jury's consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors to be harmless error as
long as at least one listed aggravating factor is found. See notes 110-12 and accompanying
text.
72. The death penalty laws of each of these states have figured prominently in the genesis
of capital sentencing law, for example, both Florida's and Texas' statutes were scrutinized in
the 1976 Cases. Moreover, a disproportionate number of capital cases are heard before the
courts of these states, with each state carrying a correspondingly disproportionate share of the
death sentences imposed or actually carried out. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, USA
DEATH PENALTY: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL BRIEFING 20 (1987). The states with the
highest number of prisoners on death row as of October 1, 1986, are Florida (247), Texas
(218), California (190). Since the California and Florida statutes are also representative of
typical sentencing statutes in other states, they illustrate the various ways in which improper
consideration typically arises. Texas' statute has been chosen because, as the Supreme Court
essentially acknowledged in Penry, it exacerbates the difficulties posed by "two-edged" mitigat-
ing factors. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2949 (1989).
73. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
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(1) California
The California sentencing statute highlights this problem. Although
the statute lists a variety of factors relating to the defendant and the of-
fense that are to be taken into account in the sentencing decision, it does
not identify which factors are intended to be mitigating and which are to
be aggravating. 75 The California Supreme Court has consistently re-
jected the argument that juries could misinterpret the nature of any of
the factors listed in the statute. In People v. Jackson, 76 the court main-
tained that the "aggravating or mitigating nature of any of the factors
should be self-evident to any reasonable person within the context of a
particular case."' 77 Since the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized the potential dual implications of certain mitigating factors, how-
ever, it seems clear that the statute actually codifies this ambiguity by
failing to distinguish between mitigating and aggravating factors. As a
result, the jury is left without guidance to determine whether a factor
mitigates or aggravates the defendant's crime.
In Jackson, the California Supreme Court rejected the argument
that the statute fails to provide adequate guidance to the jury by not
distinguishing aggravating factors from mitigating factors.78 California
Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird argued in her dissenting opinion,
however, that the mitigating or aggravating nature of several of the listed
factors can be subject to differing interpretations by reasonable persons. 79
Chief Justice Bird specifically pointed to the provision regarding mental
disorder as an example of a potentially ambiguous factor.8 0 This section
of the statute asks the sentencer to consider "[w]hether or not at the time
of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was
impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the affects of
intoxication."81
According to the plurality, it was "quite obvious that diminished
capacity of this type is a mitigating factor. '82 The court cited as support-
75. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988).
76. 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980) (plurality opinion) (constru-
ing 1977 statute), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981).
77. Id. at 316, 618 P.2d at 176, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
78. Id. at 316-17, 618 P.2d at 176-77, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 630-31. The California Supreme
Court cited Jackson in holding that the 1978 death penalty law, which closely resembles the
old law, is also not invalid for its failure to distinguish aggravating factors from mitigating
factors. People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 730, 777-79, 726 P.2d 113, 143-44, 230 Cal. Rptr.
667, 697-98 (1986).
79. Id. at 353, 618 P.2d at 187, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (Bird, J., dissenting).
80. Id., 618 P.2d at 187, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (Bird, J., dissenting).
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(h) (formerly 190.3(g)) (West 1988).
82. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d at 316, 618 P.2d at 176, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 630. In support of its
assertion, the plurality noted that this factor is "specifically listed as a mitigating factor by the
drafters of the Model Penal Code provision on sentencing standards." Id. The court went on
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ing authority the Model Penal Code which lists "mental disease or de-
fect" as a mitigating factor.8 3 Clearly, the California statute was
intended to identify "mental disease or defect" as a mitigating factor. As
Chief Justice Bird argued, however, without labels or standards to help
the jury determine which of the enumerated factors are aggravating cir-
cumstances and which are mitigating, "[s]ome sentencing authorities...
may come to the conclusion that this is a mitigating circumstance" while
"[o]thers ... may consider this a factor favoring execution." ' s4
Another factor listed in the statute asks the sentencer to consider
"[w]hether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. '8 5 In
People v. Poggi,86 defendant presented the same argument that, because
the statute does not identify this factor as a mitigating circumstance, it
"impermissibly authorizes the trier of fact to consider it as a factor in
aggravation. 81 7 Again, the California Supreme Court maintained that
"it seems plain that the provision does not authorize the jury to consider
the presence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance in
aggravation." 88
The court, however, has expressed concern that prosecutors have
taken advantage of the statute's lack of guidance to associate these miti-
gating factors with aggravating factors in the minds of the jury. In Poggi,
the court acknowledged that the prosecution "linked defendant's vio-
lence and mental illness in a troubling manner"8 9 by suggesting that the
defendant's mental illness was simply an aggravating factor contributing
to his dangerousness. Despite recognizing this problem, the court again
rejected the argument that the California statute fails to provide sufficient
guidance to help jurors distinguish between mitigating and aggravating
factors. Under California law the sentencing authority either may mis-
characterize the existence of one of the enumerated factors as an aggra-
vating factor, or may link the defendant's mental illness with a
nonstatutory aggravating factor, thereby considering certain factors that
should weigh towards mitigation as factors favoring execution.
A further unjust consequence of the statute's lack of guidance is
that, depending upon which side of the sentencing equation a jury
to note that the California statute incorporates most of the capital sentencing provisions of the
Model Penal Code and that the United States Supreme Court had expressed its approval of
these provisions. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193-94 (1976).
83. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(4)(g) (1980).
84. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d at 353, 618 P.2d at 187, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (Bird. J.,
dissenting).
85. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(d) (West 1988).
86. 45 Cal. 3d 306, 753 P.2d 1082, 246 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3261
(1989).
87. Id. at 344, 753 P.2d at 1106, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
88. Id. 753 P.2d at 1106, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
89. Id. at 345, 753 P.2d at 1106, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
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chooses to weigh a defendant's mental illness, "identically situated de-
fendants will be sentenced differently." 90
(2) Texas
The problem of improper consideration under the Texas statute is
subsumed by an even more egregious constitutional defect. Not only
does the statute fail to provide the guidance necessary to ensure that ju-
ries properly identify certain evidence as mitigatory, but, as the Supreme
Court recently recognized in Penry v. Lynaugh,91 it also fails to ensure
that the sentencer can give mitigating effect to such evidence.
The Texas statute requires the sentencing jury to answer the follow-
ing three questions in the affirmative before condemning a capital
defendant:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the
deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expecta-
tion that the death of the deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to
society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if
any, by the deceased. 92
Numerous commentators,93 and the Fifth Circuit itself,94 have ar-
gued that the statute fails to meet even the basic requirement of Lockett
v. Ohio95 that the jury not be precluded from considering "as a mitigat-
ing factor"9 6 any mitigating circumstance proffered by the defendant.
Since each of the statutory questions relate only to aggravating circum-
stances, a jury easily could find that mitigating evidence not directly per-
tinent to any of the three questions is irrelevant to their task.
90. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d at 353, 618 P.2d at 187, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 641 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting)..
91. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
92. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1979).
93. See, eg., Clary, Voting for Death: Lingering Doubts About the Constitutionality of
Texas' Death Capital Sentencing Procedure, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 353, 359-74 (1987); Crump,
Capital Murder: The Issues in Texas, 14 Hous. L. REv. 531, 563-81 (1977); Davis, Texas
Capital Sentencing Procedures: The Role of the Jury and the Restraining Hand of the Expert,
69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 300, 300-07 (1978); Dix, Administration of Texas Death Pen-
alty Statutes: Constitutional Infirmities Related to the Prediction of Dangerousness, 55 TEX. L.
REV. 1343, 1361-77 (1977); Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 36, at 339-41; Sicola & Shreves, Jury
Consideration of Mitigating Evidence: A Renewed Challenge to the Constitutionality of the
Texas Death Penalty Statute, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55 (1988).
94. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 920-26 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
95. 438 U.S. 586 (1978). See notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 604.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court, in Jurek v. Texas, 97 up-
held the statute, insisting that the statute does allow evidence of mitigat-
ing factors to come in under the second question regarding future
dangerousness.
Yet, even if a jury properly identifies a defendant's mental illness "as
a mitigating factor," there is no opportunity under the Texas scheme to
give it "independent mitigating weight."'98 If anything, the jury may be
constrained to hold that the defendant's mental illness, although reduc-
ing culpability, must be considered in aggravation because it contributes
to his dangerousness. As the Fifth Circuit had stated in its opinion in
Penry, evidence of the defendant's retardation, arrested emotional devel-
opment, and troubled youth
made it more likely, not less likely, that the jury would answer the
second question [regarding future dangerousness] yes. It did not allow
the jury to consider a major thrust of Penry's evidence as mitigating
evidence. We do not see how the evidence ... could, under the in-
structions and the special issues, be fully acted upon by the jury. There
is no place for the jury to say "no" to the death penalty based on prin-
cipal mitigating force of those circumstances. 99
In its recent consideration of Penry, the Supreme Court grudgingly
recognized the Texas statute gives inadequate guidance regarding in-
dependent mitigating weight. The Court limited the effect of its admis-
sion, however, by stating that only "[in this case" did the Texas statute
fail to provide a vehicle for the jury to "consider and give effect to the
mitigating evidence.' °°
Constrained by its opinion in Jurek, and limited by the pleadings
that left unchallenged the facial validity of the Texas statute, the Penry
Court did not address the constitutionality of Texas' capital scheme as a
whole. 0 1 The Court acknowledged, however, that, as applied in the cir-
cumstances of Penry's case, the Texas statute was constitutionally inade-
quate. Confirming the analysis of prior critics of the statute, the Court
observed that the evidence presented by Penry regarding his mental re-
tardation and abusive childhood is relevant to the second "special issue"
regarding future dangerousness "only as an aggravating factor because it
97. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
98. 438 U.S. at 605.
99. Penry, 832 F.2d at 925 (emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit strongly criticized
the Texas statute, asking rhetorically: "How can a jury act on its 'discretion to consider rele-
vant evidence that might cause it to decline to impose the death penalty?' . . . Where, in the
Texas scheme is the 'moral inquiry' of the 'individualized assessment of the appropriateness of
the death penalty?' "Id. (quoting McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987) and California
v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
100. Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2952 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 2945 ("Penry does not challenge the facial validity of the Texas death penalty
statute, which was upheld against an Eighth Amendment challenge in Jurek v. Texas.").
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suggests a yes answer to the question of future dangerousness."' 10 2 Con-
sequently, the Court concluded, it would be necessary to supplement the
statute with instructions "informing the jury that it could consider and
give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and
abused background by declining to impose the death penalty."10 3
Whether the Court's solution will in practice cure the flaws in the
Texas statute is not clear. In essence, the Court is requiring that on re-
mand the Penry jury be provided with instructions that will permit it to
avoid the conclusions compelled by the statute. If Penry's mental retar-
dation and legacy of childhood abuse do in fact render him likely to
"commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society," °4 the statute compels a "yes" answer to the second
special issue. Thus, as Justice Scalia argued in dissent, under the major-
ity's analysis "the [statute's] constitutionality turns on whether the ques-
tions allow mitigating factors not only to be considered (and, of course,
given effect in answering the questions), but also to be given effect in all
possible ways, including ways that the questions do not permit."0 5 The
effect of the Court's holding is that the Texas death penalty statute, as
applied in Penry's case, is constitutional only if the jury is informed that
it may nullify the conclusion the statute itself mandates. A sounder
holding might require instead that the assurances of proper consideration
of mitigating circumstances be incorporated into the statutory scheme
itself rather than superimposing such assurances in opposition to the
statute.
Despite these flaws, Penry is important because it recognizes that the
ambiguous nature of certain mitigating evidence requires that juries be
provided close guidance to ensure that such evidence is considered and
given effect "as mitigating evidence."
(3) Florida
Though the Florida statute 10 6 reduces the possibility that juries will
improperly consider truly mitigating factors as aggravating circum-
stances, several cases reveal that the problem remains. 10 7
102. Id. at 2949.
103. Id. at 2952. The Court also held that the first question of the statute regarding delib-
eration failed to ensure that juries would give effect to the mitigating evidence presented by the
defendant. The Court required that instructions be provided to the jury on remand defining
the word "deliberately" "in a way that would clearly direct the jury to consider fully Penry's
mitigating evidence as it bears on his personal culpability." Id. at 2949. Only then could it be
assured that "the jury [is] able to give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental
retardation and history of abuse in answering the first special issue." Id.
104. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1979).
105. Id. at 2966 (emphasis in original) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp. 1989).
107. See Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979); Huckaby v. State, 343 So. 2d 29 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977). Note that the jury plays only an advisory role in capital
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Unlike the California statute, which does not label the enumerated
circumstances as either "aggravating" or "mitigating," the Florida law
contains separate sections for the two types of factors. 0 8 The labeling of
mitigating factors, particularly factors relating to mental illness or distur-
bance, diminishes the possibility that the jury will improperly identify
such factors as aggravating.- Nonetheless, the statute lists only extreme
forms of mental disturbance or impairment, 0 9 leaving the possibility that
lesser forms of mental disorder will not be given "independent weight" as
mitigating factors.
The Florida law also limits consideration of aggravating circum-
stances to the eleven enumerated in the statute, in contrast to other state
statutes that expressly permit consideration of aggravating factors not
enumerated in the statute. 0 This aspect of the Florida law substantially
limits the possibility that the jury will consider aggravating factors other
than those listed in the statute."'I The Florida Supreme Court, however,
has undermined this precaution by applying the "harmless error" rule in
circumstances when the sentencer considers nonstatutory aggravating
factors in violation of the statute's prohibition. The court has held such
error to be harmless as long as it believes "the result of the [trial judge's]
weighing process would not have been different had the impermissible
factor not been present."' 1 2 Consequently, despite the precautions writ-
sentencing under the Florida scheme. Pursuant to § 921.141(3), the judge retains ultimate
authority to follow or disregard the recommendation of the jury."
108. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (aggravating); § 921.141(6) (mitigating) (West 1985 &
Supp. 1989).
109. Section 921.141(6) includes among its list of seven mitigating circumstances that:
"(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired."
110. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West Supp. 1989), titled "Aggravating Circum-
stances," states that "[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: . ... "
111. There always remains the possibility that the jury will, either deliberately or uninten-
tionally, allow extraneous factors to enter into the decision, despite strict guidance. Jurors
may introduce improper factors into the deliberations as nonstatutory aggravating factors, or
may give undue weight to an enumerated factor out of discriminatory or arbitrary motives.
See Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 6-7, 23-53 (survey of jurors' reasons for voting for
or against capital punishment suggests "quite strongly that there is no way to guide the discre-
tion of juries." Id.)
112. Jackson v. Wainwright, 421 So. 2d 1385 (1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983).
The Florida Supreme Court originally ruled that the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors
was acceptable if no mitigating circumstances are found, and some statutory aggravating cir-
cumstances exist to support the death sentence. Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002-03
(1977), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1982). As the court stated, "The absence of mitigating
circumstances becomes important, because, so long as there are some statutory aggravating
circumstances, there is no danger that nonstatutory circumstances have served to overcome
the mitigating circumstances in the weighing process which is dictated by our statute." Id. at
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ten into Florida's death penalty statute, judges and juries may neverthe-
less link truly mitigatory evidence to enumerated aggravating factors, or
consider extraneous aggravating factors despite clear instructions to con-
sider only those listed in the statute.
One Florida case reveals how mental and emotional impairment
may be linked to, or misidentified as, factors specifically listed by the
statute as "aggravating." In Huckaby v. State, the trial judge found the
existence of two statutory aggravating factors:1 13 that the defendant had
"knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons,"11 4 and that
the crime was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."115 Despite "al-
most total agreement" among the medical experts on the defendant's
mental illness and its controlling influence on him" 16 the trial judge
found no mitigating circumstances in the case and thus imposed a death
sentence.
The Florida Supreme Court vacated the defendant's death sentence,
however, based on its finding that the statutory aggravating factors iden-
tified by the trial judge were the "direct consequence of defendant's
mental illness." '1 17 Yet, the court did not rule that the trial judge's find-
ings regarding the two tainted aggravating factors constituted error.
Rather the court took the unusual step of ruling, sua sponte, that the
evidence of the defendant's mental illness showed the existence of two
statutory mitigating circumstances, and that these mitigating circum-
stances outweighed the aggravating circumstances in the case.118
1003 (citations omitted). Despite this proscription, however, the court has since ruled that
even where mitigating circumstances are found to exist, the use of nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances may be harmless error. The judgment will stand if "the result of [the trial
judge's] weighing process would not have been different had the impermissible factor not been
present." Id. at 1388; see also Jacobs v. State, 396 So. 2d 1113, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933
(1981) (distinguishing Elledge).
113. Huckabay v. State, 343 So. 2d 29, cert denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977). The trial judge
also found a third aggravating circumstance based upon his determination that the defendant
had a propensity to commit rape and therefore constituted "a danger and menace to society."
rd. at 33 & n. 11. On review, the Florida Supreme Court rejected this third factor as an im-
proper nonstatutory aggravating factor. Id. The court's decision, however, predated the
court's establishment of the harmless error rule in Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998 (1977)
(discussed at supra note 112).
114. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(c).
115. Id. at § 921.141(5)(h).
116. Huckaby, 343 So. 2d at 33.
117. Id. at 34.
118. Normally, a death sentence will be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing
upon a finding of error in the original sentencing proceeding. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 373 So.
2d 882, 886 (1979); Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1004 (1977), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981
(1982). As the Florida Supreme Court stated: "It is not the function of this court to cull
through what has been listed as aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the trial court's
order, determine which are proper for consideration and which are not, and then impose the
proper sentence. In accordance with the statute, the culling process must be done by the trial
court." Mikenas v. State, 367 So. 606, 610 (1978), appeal after remand, 407 So. 2d 606 (1978),
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Huckaby and another Florida case, Miller v. State, 119 reveal how
mental illness also may be used or identified as a nonstatutory aggravat-
ing factor under the Florida scheme. In each case, the trial judge al-
lowed the defendant's mental disorder to be used as a factor in
aggravation because it led to a propensity to commit future violent
acts.12 0 In Miller, the trial judge noted in his sentencing order that testi-
mony established that the defendant would never recover from his dan-
gerous mental sickness or illness. Consequently, because of "the reality
of Florida law wherein life imprisonment is not, in fact, life imprison-
ment," ' 2' the trial judge concluded that "the only assurance society can
receive that this man never again commits to another human being what
he did to that lady, is that the ultimate sentence of death be imposed." 22
The Florida Supreme Court found that it was "clear from the trial
judge's sentencing order that he considered as an aggravating factor the
defendant's allegedly incurable and dangerous mental illness."'' 2 3 As the
court noted, "the trial judge's use of the defendant's mental illness, and
his resulting propensity to commit violent acts as an aggravating factor"
was not only technically improper because it was used as a nonstatutory
aggravating factor "tipping the balance in favor of the death penalty,"
but was also contrary to the clear intent of the Florida legislature. 124 As
the court stated,
The legislature has not authorized consideration of the probability of
recurring violent acts by the defendant if he is released on parole in the
distant future. To the contrary, a large number of the statutory miti-
gating factors reflect a legislative determination to mitigate the death
penalty in favor of a life sentence for those persons whose responsibil-
ity for their violent actions has been substantially diminished as a re-
sult of a mental illness, uncontrolled emotional state of mind, or drug
abuse. 12 5
The foregoing illustrates how mitigating factors such as mental ill-
ness may be improperly considered under three states' death penalty stat-
utes as aggravating factors. Some courts, identifying instances of such
misapplication of mitigating evidence, or situations in which improper
consideration could occur, have taken steps to remedy the problem in
those individual cases. This occurred in the United States Supreme
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1011 (1972). Florida law, nonetheless, permits courts to correct illegal
sentences without a resentencing hearing. Anderson v. State, 267 So. 2d 8, 10 (1971).
119. 373 So. 2d 882 (1979).
120. Id. at 885-86; Huckaby, 343 So. 2d at 33 & n.ll.
121. 373 So. 2d at 885.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 885-86. The use of the nonstatutory aggravating factor was not harmless error
under Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998 (1977), cert denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1982), because the
trial court also found the existence of three mitigating circumstances.
125. Miller, 373 So. 2d at 886.
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Court's recent decision in Penry, and in the Florida Supreme Court's
Miller decision.
In many cases, however, it may be impossible for a reviewing court
to discern that mitigating evidence has been misapplied. Incomplete jury"
findings, or statutes that permit minimal jury findings regarding the ag-
gravating circumstances relied upon to impose death, may render unre-
viewable many instances of improper consideration. Furman and its
progeny suggest that death sentencing statutes must provide better gui-
dance to the sentencing authority in capital cases to prevent the possibil-
ity of mitigating factors being used to support death judgments.
III. The Case Against Improper Consideration
The United States Supreme Court, in Zant v. Stephens, 126 provided
solid footing for a challenge to the validity of modern capital punishment
schemes when it announced that mislabeling mitigating factors can vio-
late due process. In large part the failure of death penalty statutes to
effectuate the fundamental policies set forth in Furman and the cases
following it constitutes their overriding deficiency.
Immediately following the 1976 Cases, only a few justices and schol-
ars argued that modern death schemes fail to provide for the guidance
and individualization that Furman and its progeny require.12 7 This view
has since gained acceptance. At least one federal circuit court has felt
constrained by precedent to uphold the constitutionality of a state stat-
ute, despite expression of serious doubts about the statute's validity.1 28
Most states have strained to salvage sentencing schemes by requiring
supplemental jury instructions to increase the level of guidance provided
in the deficient statute.' 29 These instructions typically require judges to
126. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
127. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242, 1260-62 (Miss. 1976) (Inzer, J., dissent-
ing); People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 339-65, 618 P. 2d 149, 178-95, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 632-
49 (1980) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981); see also Liebman & Shep-
hard, supra note 7, at 836 (underlying justifications for death penalty must be "ensconced in
legal procedures with varying degrees of dispatch").
128. The Fifth Circuit noted throughout its opinion in Penry that the Supreme Court had
validated the Texas statute in Jurek. Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 920-26 (1987). As the
Fifth Circuit observed:
Developing Supreme Court law, however, recognizes a constitutional right that the
jury have some discretion to decline to impose the death penalty. There is a question
whether the Texas scheme permits the full range of discretion which the Supreme
Court may require. Perhaps, it is time to reconsider Jurek in light of that developing
law.
Id. at 925 (footnotes omitted).
129. See Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1982) (requiring instructions
defining aggravating and mitigating circumstances because Mississippi statute fails to provide
such guidance), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983); Jordan v. Thigpen, 688 F.2d 395, 397 (5th
Cir. 1982) (instructions required in Mississippi stating that consideration of aggravating cir-
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
inform jurors of the nature and function of mitigating circumstances, and
are often called "focusing instructions." There are several compelling
reasons, however, why such "hole plugging" remedies do not satisfy the
requirements of a constitutional death penalty. First, there is no indica-
tion that focusing instructions, although required by the Fifth and Elev-
enth Circuits, are mandated by state or federal appellate courts in other
jurisdictions. If anything, most courts appear to resist tampering with
the guidance provided in capital penalty statutes.130 The death penalty,
however, must meet constitutional standards in all jurisdictions.
Second, one might argue that courts are usurping legislative author-
ity when they impose additional jury instruction requirements to shore
up the inadequate guidance provided in the statutes. Because these in-
structions are imposed to cure constitutional deficiencies, they are mate-
rial changes to the law that should be made by legislative, rather than
judicial bodies. 131
Finally, if modern capital punishment schemes fail to provide a con-
stitutionally sufficient level of guidance, it is the responsibility of the
Supreme Court to establish minimum constitutional standards for the
states to follow to cure systemic violations of constitutional safeguards.
The maintenance of constitutional rights should not depend upon the
grace of appellate tribunals and piecemeal case-by-case remedies.
Moreover, the Supreme Court's reluctance to reexamine the consti-
tutionality of the "guided discretion" statutes of the type it approved in
1976,132 should not be grounds for blind acceptance of these decisions as
immutable proclamations on the law of capital sentencing. The courts,
and the Supreme Court in particular, currently display "a marked aver-
cumstances is limited to those in statute), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 57 (1988); Goodwin v.
Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 801-02 (11th Cir. 1982) (instructions required in Georgia which
"'clearly guide a jury in its understanding of mitigating circumstances and their purpose"), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1098 (1983); Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 470 (5th Cir. 1981) (instructions
about mitigating circumstances required in Georgia), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982); see
also Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242 (Miss. 1976) (construing Mississippi death penalty stat-
ute as constitutional under 1976 Cases).
130. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 316, 618 P.2d 149, 176, 168 Cal. Rptr.
603, 630 (declining to require labeling of factors in California death statute).
131. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 337 So. 2d 1242, 1260 (Miss. 1976) (Inzer, J., dissenting):
"[T]his Court has the authority ... to say that the punishment prescribed by the legislature
under our capital murder statute constitutes cruel and inhuman punishment, but we do not
have the authority to prescribe incidents and conditions necessary to make the statute constitu-
tional. That function belongs entirely to the legislature." The plurality in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976), contemplated that sentencing procedure would be determined by state
legislatures, rather than by courts forced to prescribe conditions necessary to maintain consti-
tutional safeguards. As the Court stated, "No longer can a jury wantonly and freakishly im-
pose the death sentence; it is always circumscribed by legislative guidelines." Id. at 206-07.
132. The Court's granting of certiorari in Penry to reexamine whether the Texas statute
approved in Jurek allows for a sufficient degree of discretion with respect to mitigating factors
perhaps indicates the Court's willingness to reconsider the 1976 Cases.
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sion to information about how the death penalty works in practice...
because the operational evidence continues to contradict the rosy future
the Court predicted for capital schemes." 133 As the rising voices in the
lower courts reach an uproar, the Court may be forced to take another
look at these statutes.
In brief, modem death penalty schemes are constitutionally deficient
in four respects. First, they fail to guide the jury adequately in identify-
ing and understanding the application of mitigating factors, contrary to
the dictates of Furman v. Georgia. 134 Second, they permit and even con-
done the introduction of improper aggravating circumstances into the
sentencing equation in contravention of the Court's announcement in
Zant v. Stephens 135 Third, they condone the use of nonstatutory aggra-
vating factors, opening the door for the arbitrariness and discrimination
that the Court in Furman and its progeny tried to prevent. Finally, they
violate Lockett v. Ohio 136 by raising the substantial possibility that am-
biguous mitigating factors will be viewed as aggravating factors and
therefore not be accorded independent mitigating weight.
A. Insufficient Guidelines
In Gregg v. Georgia,137 the first of the five 1976 Cases, the Court
emphasized that "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action."' 138
The preeminent shortcoming of modem death penalty statutes is their
failure to provide such guidance.
In 1971, in McGautha v. California, 139 Justice Harlan argued that
the factors that should guide a sentencer in determining whether a life
should be taken or spared are too complex to be reduced to a tidy
formula, and thus warned that sentencing guidelines can probably be no
more than "meaningless 'boilerplate."'14o The Supreme Court rejected
Justice Harlan's view in the 1976 Cases by insisting that proper sentenc-
ing guidelines could adequately prevent the arbitrary and capricious im-
position of death sentences. Examining these statutes in light of the
peculiar problems posed by mitigating factors such as mental disorder,
however, reveals that they have yet to address adequately Justice
Harlan's concerns.
133. Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 28, at 4.
134. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See text accompanying notes 21-27.
135. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). See text accompanying notes 12-15.
136. 438 U.S. 986 (1978). See text accompanying notes 43-51.
137. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
138. Id. at 189.
139. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
140. Id. at 208. *
The ability of judges and juries to mischaracterize as aggravating
certain factors that the Supreme Court has insisted may only be consid-
ered as mitigating illustrates that sentencing authorities are not receiving
sufficient guidance. The Gregg requirement that juries receive guidance
regarding relevant factors seems to mandate clear instruction as to either
the proper mitigating or aggravating circumstances so that evidence is
not weighed by the sentencer in a way the legislature did not intend, 14' or
instruction regarding the primary societal goals of capital punishment so
that the sentencing authority may make an informed determination
whether particular evidence should be viewed as mitigating or aggravat-
ing. 142 Merely listing the circumstances to be considered has not pro-
vided enough guidance to sentencing authorities. As a result, the
constitutional rights of capital defendants' are violated when juries mis-
characterize truly mitigating evidence.
As Florida's death penalty sentencing statute illustrates, however,
simply labeling mitigating and aggravating factors may cure only some of
the problems associated with ambiguous mitigating factors. Under Lock-
ett, the jury must not be precluded from giving "independent weight" to
any mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant. Thus, even if the
sentencing authority is not improperly identifying mitigating circum-
stances as aggravating, a substantial possibility remains that the jury will
fail to give effect to mitigating evidence because it fails to recognize it as
mitigatory.
As indicated above, a number of courts have recognized the neces-
sity of defining mitigating and aggravating circumstances for the jury in
141. This view has been adopted at least by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, and argued by
dissenting justices in several states. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
142. In the 1976 Cases, the Court indicated that capital sentencing procedures must be
linked to the underlying substantive requirements of the eighth amendment. As the Court
stated in Gregg, to avoid constitutional strictures a penalty must "accord with 'the dignity of
man,' " which the Court stated is "the 'basic concept underlying the eighth amendment.' "
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
Practically, the Court explained, this standard requires that the punishment not be excessive,
which in turn means that it must not unnecessarily inflict pain or be disproportionate to the
severity of the crime. Id. To ensure that pain is not inflicted gratuitously, the Court contin-
ued, the sanction must contain some recognized penological justification. Id. at 182-83.
Justice Bird in Jackson argued that statutes clearly identifying the factors that are aggra-
vating and those that are not, and requiring written findings of at least one statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance, sufficiently ensure that death sentences accrued with a state's primary
penological justifications for utilizing the death penalty. 28 Cal. 3d 352-54, 618 P.2d 186-88,
168 Cal. Rptr. 640-42.
Justice Brennan, however, has argued that the death penalty should require actual in-
structions regarding penological justification. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 283-87
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This view has been espoused by at least several commenta-
tors. See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 36, at 367-73; Liebman & Shephard, supra note 7, at
785-86; Comment, supra note 46, at 711-12, n.l 17. 0
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order to ensure that the evidence is given proper consideration. 143
Although it may appear that the aggravating or mitigating nature of vari-
ous factors introduced into evidence during a sentencing hearing would
be "self-evident to any reasonable person,"' 44 the heightened concern for
reliability and fairness in capital sentencing 45 requires such precaution-
ary instructions.146
B. Improper Aggravating Circumstances
Although numerous judges and scholars recognize the problem of
ambiguous mitigating factors, the significance of the Supreme Court's an-
nouncement in Zant v. Stephens 147 that due process would be violated if
a state "attached the 'aggravating' label to factors . . . that actually
should militate in favor of a lesser penalty such as perhaps a defendant's
mental illness"' 48 has yet to be appreciated. This failure may be ex-
plained by the fact that the statement is made in dictum and is not fur-
ther elaborated. Moreover, the Court introduced its supporting
authority for the statement with the "cf "signal, suggesting that the case
143. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. In Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464, 471 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 111 (1982), the court stated that the "guidance" requirement
of the 1976 Cases required judges to "clearly and explicitly instruct the jury about mitigating
circumstances and the option to recommend against death; in order to do so, the judge will
normally tell the jury what a mitigating circumstance is and what its function is in the jury's
sentencing deliberations." Id. at 471 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
144. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d at 316, 618 P.2d at 176, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
145. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), decided the same day as Furman, the
Court stated: "It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation of
authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands." Id. at 481. The Court has therefore imposed unique procedural require-
ments where society's ultimate criminal sanction, the death penalty, is involved. See supra
notes 21-57 and accompanying text. As the Court stated in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
411 (1986) (plurality opinion), "In capital proceedings generally, this Court has demanded
that factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of reliability .... This especial
concern is a natural consequence of the knowledge that execution is the most irremedial and
unfathomable of penalties; that death is different." (citations omitted).
146. See Comment, supra note 46, at 711 n.117. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
192, in which the Court insisted:
the provision of relevant information under fair procedural rules is not alone suffi-
cient to guarantee that the information will be properly used in the imposition of
punishment, especially if sentencing is to be performed by a jury. Since the members
of a jury will have had little, if any, previous experience in sentencing, they are un-
likely to be skilled in dealing with the information they are given (emphasis added).
The Court then stated that the problem could be alleviated by giving the jury "guidance"
regarding the factors to be taken into account in the sentencing determination. Id.
147. 462.U.S. 862 (1983).
148. Id. at 885.
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it was citing, Miller v. State, 149 stands only for an analogous
proposition. 150
The Court's reference to Miller, however, is highly significant. In
that case, the Florida Supreme Court held that the sentencer's considera-
tion of the defendant's mental illness as a nonstatutory aggravating factor
was improper. 15 ' Though the Court's discussion in Stephens noted only
that the state may not mislabel mitigating factors,152 the Court's refer-
ence to Miller suggests that it also would consider the mislabeling of mit-
igating factors by the sentencing authority, as occurred in Miller, an
equally apparent violation of due process.
The lack of guidance given to juries in understanding mitigating and
aggravating circumstances leaves open the possibility that certain miti-
gating factors will either be linked to, or be considered independently as,
aggravating factors. Because Stephens suggests that this lack constitutes
a violation due process, the failure of modern death penalty statutes to
provide constitutionally sufficient guidance becomes evident.
The problem reaches further. A number of states do not require the
sentencer to reveal the aggravating circumstances relied upon to support
a death verdict, or only require the sentencer to make an explicit finding
as to the existence of one listed aggravating factor. 153 Consequently, in
these states there may be no way to determine in these states whether the
decision to execute was supported by improper aggravating factors.
149. 373 So. 3d 882 (Fla. 1989).
150. Id. The Court cited Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882 (Fla. 1979) in which the Florida
Supreme Court found that the trial judge had considered defendant's mental illness as a non-
statutory aggravating factor. Id. at 885-86. The Florida court held that the trial judge's find-
ing on this issue was reversible error. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
151. Id. at 885. One should note that the fact that the Florida statute purports to limit
consideration of aggravating factors to those listed in the statute does not render the Court's
affirmation of the Miller holding inapplicable to those states that do allow consideration of
nonstatutory aggravating factors. The Zant Court's citation to Miller is not based on the
aspect of the holding relating to the impermissibility of a Florida trial court considering non-
statutory aggravating factors. Rather, the citation notes the impropriety of considering miti-
gating factors on the side of aggravation. Regardless, the Court in Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S.
939 (1983) (plurality opinion), decided the same summer as Zant, held that consideration of
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances under the Florida statute is harmless error so long as
the improper factor is not one which would be constitutionally impermissible to consider in
aggravation. Id. at 984-88. The holding in Barclay thus negates any distinction between the
Florida statute, which purports to limit sentencer consideration of mitigating factors to those
listed in the statute, and those statutes explicitly allowing consideration of nonstatutory aggra-
vating factors.
152. The Court makes the statement in the middle of a discussion regarding what the State
of Georgia could not have permissibly included in its instructions to a capital jury. Stephens,
462 U.S. at 885.
153. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1988); People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d
730, 777-79, 726 P.2d 113, 143-44, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 697-98 (1986) (written findings by jury
as to the aggravating factors supporting a death judgment not required).
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The Supreme Court clearly established in Stephens that the consid-
eration of mitigating factors such as mental illness in aggravation may
violate due process.154 Consequently, modem capital sentencing
schemes, by condoning improper consideration and often providing no
opportunity for meaningful appellate scrutiny of the death penalty deci-
sion, allow violations of fundamental constitutional rights to go unde-
tected. Particularly in a matter "so grave as the determination of
whether a human life should be taken or spared,"'' 55 the law cannot toler-
ate such a situation.
C. Nonstatutory Aggravating Factors
Current death penalty statutes may also violate the constitutional
requirement of adequate sentencer guidance by failing to limit considera-
tion of nonstatutory aggravating factors.1 56 The United States Supreme
Court, in Zant v. Stephens, concluded that death penalty schemes need
not preclude consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors. 157 The
Court cautioned, however, that the sentencer may not rely on aggravat-
ing factors that are "constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant
to the sentencing process." 158 The Court's directive against considera-
tion of impermissable factors fails to adequately protect constitutional
guarantees. Despite the Court's proscription, impermissible aggravating
factors may still influence a jury's determination to impose a death sen-
tence without the possibility of meaningful judicial review. In states that
do not require complete findings by the sentencing authority of factors
relied on to support a death verdict, the use of improper nonstatutory
factors may go undetected. Even where such findings are required, im-
proper factors may "color" the sentencer's weighing process, though un-
reported as distinct factors relied upon by the jury. It thus appears that
limitations on the consideration of improper nonstatutory aggravating
factors must be made clear to the sentencer before the sentencing deci-
sion takes place if death penalty statutes are to comport with the require-
ments of constitutional sentencing.
The Supreme Court's motivation in restructuring the American
death penalty system in Furman and Gregg was to minimize the risk, if
not the reality, of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of capital pun-
154. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 885.
155. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
156. Approximately fifteen death penalty states expressly permit consideration ofnonstat-
utory aggravating factors. See Gillers, supra note 1, at 101-19 (appendix). Even in jurisdic-
tions whose statutes prohibit consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors, the jury may
nevertheless be permitted to rely on such factors through application of the harmless error
rule. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
157. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-89 (1983).
158. Id. at 885.
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ishment.159 Under a majority of current statutes, the sentencing determi-
nation is made through a process of weighing aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. 60 Consequently, the decision to impose the death pen-
alty lies with the sentencer's consideration of aggravating circumstances.
Because the sentencing authority retains, under Stephens, discretion to
determine what to weigh as an aggravating factor, the sentencer has vir-
tually the same unfettered discretion to decide whether to impose the
death penalty as it did prior to Furman.
The Fifth Circuit asserted this view in Henry v. Wainwright, 16! in
which the court reproved the Florida practice of permitting jurors to
consider nonstatutory aggravating factors despite its statute limiting con-
sideration of aggravating factors to those specifically enumerated by stat-
ute. 162 In the court's view, this practice not only violated state law, but
the Constitution as well. The court reasoned that permitting the consid-
eration of nonstatutory aggravating factors violated Furman by allowing
judges and juries overly broad sentencing discretion. 163 A reliable capital
sentencing scheme must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing
the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."' 164 As the Henry court argued:
We believe that permitting the jury to consider whatever evidence of
nonstatutory aggravating circumstances the prosecution might desire
to present or the jurors might discern in the testimony opens too wide
a door for the influence of arbitrary factors on the sentencing determi-
nation. By sanctioning consideration of statutory aggravating factors
plus anything else the jury determines to be aggravating, such an in-
struction broadens jury discretion rather than channels it and obscures
any meaningful basis for distinguishing cases in which the death pen-
alty is imposed from those in which it is not. 165
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Stephens permitting considera-
tion of nonstatutory aggravating factors rejects the Fifth Circuit's analy-
159. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (sentencer's "discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.").
160. See Sicola & Shreves, supra note 93, at 64-65, 65 n.61 (thirty-five of thirty-seven death
penalty states provide for some sort of balancing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances
under the general format of the Model Penal Code).
161. 661 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated mem., 457 U.S. 1114 (1982).
162. Id. at 58-59. The Florida courts had interpreted two footnotes in Proffit v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 250 n.8, 256 n.14 (1976), to permit death sentences only partially predicated on
nonstatutory aggravating factors.
163. Henry, 661 F.2d at 58-59.
164. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
165. Henry, 661 F.2d at 59 (emphasis in original). The Ninth Circuit, however, in Harris
v. Pulley, 692 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 37 (1984), specifically
repudiated the Fifth Circuit's holding in Henry that consideration of nonstatutory aggravating
factors is constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 1194. The Court held that the California stat-
ute's requirement that the jury be instructed to consider the factors listed in the statute pro-
vided sufficient guidance in light of the requirements of Furman, Gregg, and Lockett. Id.
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sis. The Stephens Court's reasoning may be questioned, however, as
contrary to the principles established in the Court's earlier death penalty
decisions. First, the Court's conclusion rests upon a controversial analy-
sis of the implications of Gregg v. Georgia. The Georgia statute upheld in
Gregg required that the jury find at least one statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance before a defendant is eligible for the death penalty. Once that
determination is made, however, the jury is provided no direction as to
how to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case to
determine if the defendant, already found to be eligible for the death pen-
alty, should in fact be sentenced to death. The Stephens Court concluded
that, since Gregg upheld such a statute leaving broad discretion in the
hands of the jury during the weighing process, aggravating circumstances
play a constitutional role of guiding sentencer discretion only in deter-
mining eligibility for the death penalty, and not during the process of
considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
This assertion conflicts with the Court's statement in Gregg that ag-
gravating circumstances serve the useful function of making death
sentences reviewable because they allow the reviewing court to examine
the "factors [the sentencer] relied upon in reaching its decision."' 66 In
addition, statutory lists of aggravating circumstances do in fact perform a
constitutionally mandated role of guiding juror discretion by informing
jurors about those factors that "the State ... deems particularly relevant
to the sentencing decision."' 167 As numerous commentators have argued,
the lists of statutory factors when read to the jury can have a pervasive
effect on the jury's sentencing deliberations.1 68 Moreover, in two cases
decided the same day as Furman, the Court invalidated two capital stat-
utes that gave the sentencer broad discretion during the weighing stage of
deliberations. 169 Consequently, the Stephens Court's interpretation of
Gregg permitting open-ended discretion during the critical stage at which
the sentencer determines whether a capital defendant should live or die
directly contravenes Court precedent.
Second, the Stephens Court supported its conclusion permitting con-
sideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors by inappropriately citing
Lockett and its requirement of unlimited consideration of mitigating cir-
cumstances.1 70 The Stephens Court's reliance on the principles of Lock-
ett, however, conflicts with the policies announced in earlier Court
decisions, and with Lockett itself.
166. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195.
167. Id.
168. See, eg., Comment, supra note 46, at 717-17, n. 145 (citing various sources that note
effect of jury instructions). 0
169. Stewart v. Massachusetts, 408 U.S. 845; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972). See
Comment, supra, note 46, at 716-17 for an analysis of the inconsistency between the Court's
holdings in Stewart and Moore, and the Stephens Court's conclusions.
170. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983).
In Lockett, the Court's overarching concern was that the sentencer
not be precluded from giving "independent weight" to any mitigating
factors the defendant might wish to establish. 71 Consequently, the
Court accorded broad sentencer discretion with regard to those factors
that might support the jury in granting mercy. No such concern was
expressed with regard to aggravating factors. In fact, in Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 172 the Court approved the Florida death penalty statute limiting jury
consideration of aggravating circumstances to those enumerated in the
statute. 173 This holding leads to the conclusion that the severity and ir-
revocability of the death penalty require reliability, and thus limited dis-
cretion, when the decision to impose the death penalty is at stake, not
solely when determining eligibility. The requirement of unlimited indi-
vidualization should therefore not extend to jury consideration of aggra-
vating circumstances, contrary to the Court's implication in Stephens.
Four years after Stephens, the Court acknowledged this reading of its
earlier decisions in McCleskey v. Kemp. 174 Recognizing that it had estab-
lished different standards for consideration of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the Court stated that although "the Constitution limits a
state's ability to narrow a sentencer's discretion to consider relevant evi-
dence that might cause it to decline to impose the death sentence," its
discretion to impose capital punishment must be narrowed by "carefully
defined standards."' 17 5
This analysis provides the resolution to the "seeming conflict' '176 or
"paradox"' 77 between the policies outlined in Furman and Lockett.
While Furman and Gregg advocated that sentencer discretion be "fo-
cused" and "guided," the Woodson-Lockett line of cases 78 established
that jurors must be given wide discretion to consider the circumstances
of each case and to determine how much weight to give each particular
171. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 577-608; see supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
172. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
173. The statute provides that "[a]ggravating circumstances shall be limited to the follow-
ing," and then lists eight factors. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (Supp. 1976-77) (current
version at id. (West Supp. 1989)).
174. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
175. Id. at 304 (emphasis in original).
176. Comment, supra note 46, at 698. Justices White and Rehnquist, in their separate
opinions in Lockett, argued that the Court's grant of wide discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances constituted a return to the unguided discretion condemned in Furman. Lockett,
438 U.S. at 621-24 (White, J., concurring), 629-33 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See also Gil-
lers, supra note 1, at 34-38, (noting Lockett's potential conflict with Furman); Hertz & Weis-
berg, supra note 36, at 373-76 (noting the seeming conflict between Furman and Lockett, but
arguing that the cases are "entirely consistent").
177. See Radin, supra note 20, at 1148-55 (Asserting that Furman and Lockett created a
paradox-the "dilemma of discretion"-in that "[tihe achievable or imaginable level of indi-
vidualization varies inversely with the achievable or imaginable level of consistency." Id. at
1149-50).
178. See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
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factor. Because only the consideration of aggravating factors can lead to
a death sentence,1 79 adequate guidance is necessary only with regard to
the sentencer's consideration of aggravating factors.1 80 As the Gregg
Court explained, Furman's guidance requirement was never intended to
restrict the freedom of sentencers to exercise mercy.18' Consequently,
"Furman only precludes capricious imposition of the death penalty and
not capricious imposition of mercy." 182 Considered in light of the
Court's concerns in Furman, both Lockett and McCleskey support the
conclusion that sentencer discretion should be limited with respect to
aggravating circumstances, rather than left wide open as the Court as-
serted in Stephens.
D. Violating the Principles of Lockett v. Ohio
The United States Supreme Court stated in Lockett v. Ohio 183 that
"the sentencer, in all but the rarest kinds of cases, [must] not be pre-
cluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any [evidence] that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."' 8 4 This
holding is often cited for the proposition that consideration of mitigating
circumstances may not be limited.185 When considered in light of the
problems. with "two-edged" mitigating factors, however, this require-
ment takes on new significance. If the sentencer inappropriately treats a
factor such as mental illness as an aggravating circumstance, then the
sentencer has not given "independent mitigating weight" to that mitigat-
179. Aggravating circumstances control the decision to impose death for two reasons: 1)
In all states, the sentencing authority is required to make a finding as to at least one statutory
aggravating circumstance; and 2) Under virtually all of the "guided discretion" statutes, the
death sentence may be imposed only if the balance of factors weigh on the side of aggravation.
180. See Goodpaster, The Year for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 299, 314-15; Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 36, at 374-76; Comment,
supra note 46, at 699.
181. The Gregg plurality wrote:
Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defend-
ant mercy violates the Constitution. Furman held only that, in order to minimize the
risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of
offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentenc-
ing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the
defendant.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (footnote omitted).
182. Comment, supra note 46, at 699.
183. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
184. Id. at 604 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
185. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2949, 2952 (1989) (absence of jury in-
structions defining "deliberately" may preclude jury from giving effect to mitigating evidence
as it relates to personal culpability; absence of instructions on option to decline to impose
death may preclude jury from giving effect to mitigating evidence); Mills v. Maryland, 108 S.
Ct. 1860, 1870 (1988) (instructions and verdict form that suggested that jury was precluded
from considering any mitigating circumstance unless all 12 jurors agreed that the circumstance
applied in the case held invalid).
ing factor, although consideration of that factor was not procedurally
impaired. Consequently, a statute that does not adequately guide the
sentencing authority to prevent the misapplication of mitigating evidence
fails to address the concerns of Lockett and is therefore unconstitutional.
Prosecutors, judges, and states themselves have rebutted this line of
reasoning by arguing that statutes cannot preclude sentencers from con-
sidering mitigating evidence because Lockett guarantees capital defend-
ants the opportunity to present any and all potentially relevant evidence
in support of mitigation. 18 6 Thus, the argument continues, the defendant
in any given case will have had an unlimited opportunity to present to
the sentencer all of the mitigating evidence in the case.
The Supreme Court, however, has insisted repeatedly that the mere
opportunity to present mitigating circumstances does not fulfill the con-
stitutional requirement that the defendant receive an individualized sen-
tencing hearing. Rather, the statute or the court through its instructions
to the jury must ensure that the sentencer is able to consider and give
effect to mitigating evidence. As the Supreme Court made clear in Gregg
v. Georgia, "the provision of relevant information under fair procedural
rules is not alone sufficient to guarantee that the information will be
properly used in the imposition of punishment, especially if sentencing is
performed by a jury."' 187
The Court, in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 188 recently reaffirmed the prin-
ciple that the mere opportunity to present unlimited mitigating circum-
stances, guaranteed by Lockett, does not ensure adequate jury
consideration of the mitigating evidence. In Hitchcock, the prosecutor,
referring to the state statute listing mitigating factors by number, told the
jury during closing argument "to consider the mitigating circumstances
and consider those by number."189 The trial judge accordingly instructed
the jury to consider only those mitigating circumstances listed in the
Florida statute, in clear violation of the Lockett principle of unlimited
opportunity for mitigation.
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the sentencing proceedings, however,
holding that the presentation of the evidence and defense counsel's argu-
ment to the jury to "consider the whole picture, the whole ball of wax,"
were sufficient to show that the defendant had received an "individual-
ized sentencing hearing" in compliance with Lockett. 190 The Supreme
Court reversed, stating that "it could not be clearer" that the jury and
judge were precluded from considering evidence of nonstatutory mitigat-
186. See Lockett, 438 U.S. 604-05 (statutes may not preclude sentencer consideration of
any circumstances proffered as a basis for a sentence less than death).
187. 428 U.S. 153, 192 (1976).
188. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
189. Id. at 398.
190. Hitchcock v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 1514, 1517-18 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc), rev'd
sub nom. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
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ing circumstances, and that "the proceedings therefore did not comport
with the requirements of... Lockett v. Ohio." 191
The Fifth Circuit also rejected arguments that defense counsel's op-
portunity to argue unlimited mitigating evidence may take the place of a
statute or adequate jury instructions that inform jurors that they may
consider and give effect to all mitigating evidence. In Spivey v. Zant, 192
for instance, the district court had found that the jury had been ade-
quately instructed on mitigation because the defendant's lawyer had
"strenuously argued to the jury that it should consider certain mitigating
circumstances in determining sentence."' 193 The Fifth Circuit flatly re-
jected the district court's finding, stating simply that " 'arguments of
counsel cannot substitute for instructions by the court.' "194
In Penry v. Lynaugh, 19 5 Texas defended its sentencing scheme before
the Fifth Circuit, asserting that defendant's counsel "could, and did, ar-
gue the mitigating circumstances to the jury."' 196 Again, the court noted
that defense counsel's arguments may not substitute for adequate provi-
sions ensuring that the sentencer is able to act upon mitigating evidence.
"[T]he mere fact that counsel argued mitigating circumstances does not
conclude the matter. The question is whether the jury could act on the
mitigating circumstances and not impose the death penalty."' 197 In its
decision in Penry, the Supreme Court reiterated this principle, stating
that, "it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigat-
ing evidence to the sentencer. The sentencer must also be able to con-
sider and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence."' 98
Modem sentencing schemes, by failing to ensure that the range of
potentially relevant mitigating evidence remains unlimited, fail to meet
the constitutional standards set out in Lockett. As these cases show, the
mere opportunity to present mitigating evidence does not guarantee that
Locketts' requirements are met.
191. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
192. 661 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982).
193. Id. at 472 n.12.
194. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1978)). See also Bell v. Wat-
kins, 692 F.2d 999, 1012 n.13 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S 843 (1983), in which the
court stated: "Counsel's argument to the jury describing mitigating, or for that matter aggra-
vating circumstances, does not make up for the court's failure to give proper instructions."
195. 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
196. Id. at 925.
197. Id. at 926.
198. Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2947 (1989) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104 (1982)).
IV. Some Solutions to the Problem of Jury Guidance and
Ambiguous Mitigating Factors
There are several ways to amend death penalty statutes to cure the
problems associated with the improper consideration of mitigating fac-
tors. Statutes could require that jury instructions inform the jury about
the penological justifications for capital punishment. These provisions
would help to ensure that the jury's consideration of mitigating and ag-
gravating circumstances is consistent with the death penalty's underlying
justifications. Additionally, or alternately, instructions could be required
that define mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Finally, statutes
could require that instructions be provided regarding each mitigating fac-
tor proffered by the defendant.
A. Instructions Regarding Penological Justification
The Supreme Court held in the 1976 Cases that a punishment must
serve some recognized penological justification to avoid constituting a
gratuitous infliction of pain in violation of the eighth amendment's prohi-
bition of cruel and unusual punishment. 199 In Gregg v. Georgia, the
Court identified the two primary justifications for the death penalty as
retribution and deterrence. 2°° If the Court is indeed intent on ensuring
that death sentences are imposed in accordance with these principles, the
logically necessary step is to require that sentencers be instructed about
these purposes and their relation to mitigating and aggravating factors.
In this way, sentencers will be able to evaluate the evidence in accord-
ance with the death penalty's underlying penological rationales.20'
The manner in which such instructions could address the deficien-
cies in modern death sentencing procedures can be seen by examining
how an ambiguous factor, such as a defendant's subnormal mental or
emotional condition, would be considered under this scheme. The jury
might be informed as to how the state intends the goals of capital punish-
ment to be analyzed. For example, the court might be required to ex-
plain that the need for vengeance should diminish in accordance with the
defendant's degree of culpability for her actions. 20 2 Additionally, the
court might explain that the need for, and value of, making the defendant
199. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182-83 (1976).
200. 428 U.S. at 183.
201. See People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 354, 618 P.2d 149, 188, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 642
(1980) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981); Liebman & Shephard, supra note
7, at 785; Comment, supra note 46, at 711-12 n.117.
202. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(2) Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (im-
paired mental capacity included as a mitigating factor because it reduces responsibility and is
especially critical in jurisdictions with strict insanity defense); Liebman & Shephard, supra
note 7, at 811 n.240 (justified retribution "must be scaled to the degree of societal condemna-
tion, which in turn depends on the moral turpitude of the defendant").
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atone for her wrongs similarly is reduced as the defendant's ability to
conform her conduct or appreciate its consequences is reduced because of
mental or emotional dysfunction.20 3 Finally, the court could inform the
jury that the value of deterrence should diminish as the ability of reason-
able persons to identify with the defendant decreases. 2 4 Under such in-
structions, a jury confronted with evidence of a defendant's subnormal
mental and emotional development should recognize and identify it as a
mitigating factor.20 5
Such instructions would address many of the inadequacies of mod-
em death statutes. First, they provide direct guidance regarding critical
goals that the Supreme Court insists must be fulfilled in sentencing a
defendant to death.206 Because such goals would be paramount in any
state's consideration of factors to include in its jury instructions, it would
be less likely that truly mitigating factors would be improperly weighed
on the side of aggravation. Second, because the jury will have been "ap-
prised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and pro-
vided with standards to guide its use of the information," 20 7 the jury's
determination of the aggravating or mitigating nature of a particular fac-
tor should be consistent with the underlying justifications for capital pun-
ishment.20 8 Finally, the implementation of this scheme would work to
ensure that an ambiguous mitigating factor will be considered as a miti-
gating factor in accordance with Lockett v. Ohio,20 9 since the sentencer
will be better equipped to identify factors that should favor leniency.210
203. See Liebman & Shephard, supra note 7, at 808-09 (commentators from Coke and
Hume through modem scholars agree that mental disorders reduce the justification for expia-
tive punishment).
204. See id. at 816 (abnormal offenders so distinguishable from other members of society
that punishment not likely to deter others); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186 (many of the post-Furman
statutes-presumably those identifying mental and emotional disturbance and the like as miti-
gating factors-reflect an effort to define those criminals for which capital punishment is most
probably an effective deterrent).
205. The reduced culpability of the defendant would diminish the justification for seeking
vengeance and requiring atonement. Also, though the value of general deterrence would not
likely change greatly between a normal and abnormal defendant, in this situation the deter-
rence value of capital punishment would clearly be diminished.
206. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 ("[s]anction imposed cannot be so totally without peno-
logical justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering").
207. Id. at 195.
208. See Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 36, at 367-73 (instructions regarding underlying
the goals of capital punishment necessary to ensure that those goals are met in sentencing-lay
jurors may not understand that a factor can mitigate by disproving the retributive and deter-
rent value of a death sentence).
209. 458 U.S. 586 (1978).
210. Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 36, at 369 (instructions regarding goals of capital pun-
ishment are necessary to ensure that the sentencer fully considers the mitigating nature of the
evidence).
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B. Instructions Defining Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances
The abstract nature of an inquiry into the stated goals of capital
punishment, however, may lessen the effectiveness of such a solution.
Thus, in addition to or instead of instructions about penological goals,
the court should define mitigating and aggravating circumstances for the
jury and explain how such factors should be considered under the state
statute. Although many courts seem to believe that jurors know what
mitigation is, 2 11 the problems that have arisen regarding the misuse of
mitigating evidence indicates that such instructions are necessary. Be-
cause the Supreme Court has suggested that this problem implicates due
process, 2 12 such instructions may be necessary if constitutional guaran-
tees are to be adequately protected. 2 13
The curative effect of focusing instructions upon the constitutional
deficiencies of modern death penalty statutes would be identical to that
of instructions regarding the penological goals of capital punishment. 2 14
Juries might also be better able to properly identify mitigatory evidence
and include it in their consideration of mitigating factors.
C. Instructions Regarding Each Mitigating Factor
The difficulty with a solution that relies solely on the focusing in-
structions described above is that such instructions may fail to address
the concerns of Lockett that the sentencer give "independent mitigating
weight" to all mitigating evidence put forward in the case. Presented by
defense counsel with a mass of unrefined evidence and argument con-
cerning the defendant's character, psychological condition, and the cir-
cumstances of the crime, the sentencer may well fail to understand that it
can consider each of the factors "as an independent basis for mitigating
sentence. '21 5 Lockett thus compels the conclusion that juries in capital
cases must be instructed as to each mitigating factor proffered by the
defendant. Itemizing the mitigating circumstances in this way would not
only go far to ensure that juries do not mischaracterize and misuse am-
211. See People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 316, 618 P.2d 149, 176, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 630
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981) (nature of enumerated factors "self-evident").
212. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983).
213. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that such focusing instructions are re-
quired by the Constitution. As the court stated in Spivey v. Zant, 661 F.2d 464 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111 (1982), the requirement of guided and focused consideration
of mitigating and aggravating circumstances means:
in most cases ... that the judge must clearly and explicitly instruct the jury about
mitigating circumstances and the option to recommend against death; in order to do
so, the judge will normally tell the jury what a mitigating circumstance is and what
its function is in the jury's sentencing deliberations.
Id. at 471.
214. See supra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
215. Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 36, at 346.
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biguous mitigating factors, but would also ensure that the jury is able to
consider the "independent mitigating weight" of each of the factors put
forward by the defendant.
Such instructions also would serve the function of calling the atten-
tion of the jury to nonstatutory mitigating factors, as well as to those
already enumerated by statute. Given the pervasive effect that jury in-
structions potentially have upon sentencing deliberations,2 16 the require-
ment set forth by the Supreme Court in the 1976 Cases that the sentencer
be given "specific and detailed guidance" 217 in making its sentencing de-
termination virtually compels the conclusion that constitutional death
penalty sentencing requires itemized instructions regarding mitigating
circumstances.
Conclusion
In its landmark death penalty decisions in 1976, the Supreme Court
set out to make rational the procedures through which states authorize
their citizens to impose society's ultimate criminal sanction. Since that
time, the standards established by the 1976 Court have undergone a con-
tinuing process of evaluation and refinement.
The Court's decisions have addressed the problems of reliability and
fairness by establishing two fundamental constitutional requirements for
death penalty sentencing: individualization and guidance. States have
responded to these requirements by establishing sentencing schemes re-
quiring the jury to balance mitigating and aggravating circumstances to
determine whether execution is justified. It has become apparent, how-
ever, that reliability and fairness have been thwarted under these schemes
because they permit potentially ambiguous mitigating factors to be con-
sidered in aggravation. Consequently, modern death penalty statutes fail
to ensure that capital defendants are accorded their constitutionally man-
dated procedural rights. This Note argues that the problem can be reme-
died by providing generalized instructions about the justifications for
capital punishment or about mitigating and aggravating circumstances
themselves, or by requiring instructions about each mitigating circum-
stance presented by the defendant.
216. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470-72 (1933) (instructions to jury may
carry controlling weight); Hertz & Weisberg, supra note 36, at 346 (express reference to partic-
ular facts or issues in jury instructions helps jurors to remember factors described in instruc-
tions, helps jurors understand legal theory of the party introducing the evidence and relevancy
of evidence to that theory, and cloaks that theory in the authority and credibility of the judge);
Severence & Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury
Instructions, 17 LAw & Soc'y REv. 153, 194-95 (1982) (instructions on target legal concepts
and issues increase the sentencer's concentration on the evidence underlying such concepts and
issues).
217. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976).
Fewer than twenty years ago, procedural rights that United States
citizens now deem fundamental and irrevocable were often only the ide-
alized visions of thoughtful champions of constitutional rights. No less is
true of the development of procedural rights under the law of capital
punishment. It is by now a fundamental tenet of eighth amendment ju-
risprudence that the proscription against cruel and unusual punishments
"draws much of its meaning from 'the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.' "218 The constitutionality of
particular aspects of the death penalty is therefore dependent upon the
Supreme Court's perception of society's prevailing standards of
decency. 2 19
This Note has shown that disparate voices have expressed concern
over a specific and curable deficiency in modern capital sentencing proce-
dures. The Supreme Court, too, in Zant v. Stephens 220 and Penry v.
Lynaugh 22 1 indicated that it recognizes the problem of improper consid-
eration of ambiguous mitigating factors. The Court misapprehended,
however, the nature and scope of this problem. Perhaps it is only a mat-
ter of time before the adoption of more rational sentencing guidelines
that address this issue becomes the standard to which our maturing soci-
ety aspires, and that our Constitution would then require.
218. 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality
opinion).
219. See id. ("North Carolina's mandatory death penalty statute for first-degree murder
departs markedly from contemporary standards respecting the imposition of death and thus
cannot be applied consistently with [the Constitution]"); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934,
2955 (1989) ("[A]t present, there is insufficient evidence of a national consensus against execut-
ing mentally retarded people convicted of capital offenses for us to conclude that it is categori-
cally prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.").
220. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
221. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
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